clearpxlGOP presidential candidates are speaking out against the drug cartels and transnational organized crime gangs who use extreme violence and threats at a time when the Obama Administration released its International Organized Crime Strategy.

For example, Republican presidential candidate Michelle Bachman is calling for tougher tactics against Mexican drug cartels such as Los Zetas. She stated during a campaign speech in Sioux City, Iowa that the Obama administration should have erected a fence over the entire southern border to keep out drug smugglers and human traffickers..

“We should build a fence on every mile, every yard, every foot and every inch of that southern border because we are engaged in a narco-terrorism war,” Bachmann said. “Narcotics are coming through. Guns are coming through and also terrorists.”

Bachman failed, however, to point out that the Obama administration canceled the “virtual fence” project which was a compromise between Republican and Democrat lawmakers that changed the original security fence for a number of security measures such as CCTV cameras and motion detectors.

That project was canceled after the Obama Homeland Security Department spent about $1 billion on equipment that malfunctioned frequently.

Bachman’s speech against drug gangs was echoed by Republican candidate Rick Perry, who said narco-terrorists represent a “clear” and “imminent” danger to the United States. He said the federal government should consider all its options to respond to the “threat.” Perry spoke during a conference organized by conservative groups.

“Make no mistake,” Perry said. “What we are looking at south of the border is nothing less than a war waged by these narco-terrorists. They are spreading violence in American cities and selling poison to our children.”

Perry described Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s effort to dismantle the drug cartels in his country. Calderon ordered troops to help police fight the cartels in December 2006, prompting a war that has killed tens of thousands of people including police officials, judges, soldiers, reporters and others.

Perry angered Mexican government officials in September when he proposed sending U.S. troops into Mexico to help battle the cartels if he is elected president. Perry also boasted that as the governor of Texas he appropriated about $400 million to secure his state’s border with Mexico.

According to U.S. law enforcement experts, narco-terrorism isn’t just a Mexican problem. Drug smuggling is believed to be financing the Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda, neo-Marxist revolutionaries in South America –such as Colombia’s FARC — and Islamic and Marxist militants in Southeast Asia.

Another House hearing on narco-terrorism is scheduled for Friday, October 14, by the Homeland Security subcommittee on oversight and investigations.

Rep. Michael McCaul (R-TX), chairman of the subcommittee, said, “Every American needs to be aware of the threat these narco-terrorists pose to our communities in every state, and to our national security. If the White House does not heed the warning that now is the time to commit to a comprehensive strategy to secure the border, it unfortunately may take a catastrophic event to get their attention.”

Other warnings about the danger to the United States and Americans were included in a recent report on border security conducted by the state of Texas.

The report titled, “Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment,” warns readers that drug cartels are trying to establish “safe houses” or “sanctuaries” from the Mexican military in border areas inside the United States.

The Texas report also claims the Mexican military’s successes against drug cartels are likely to drive more gang competition and violence into Texas.

Jim Kouri, CPP, formerly Fifth Vice-President, is currently a Board Member of the National Association of Chiefs of Police, an editor for ConservativeBase.com, and he’s a columnist for Examiner.com. In addition, he’s a blogger for the Cheyenne, Wyoming Fox News Radio affiliate KGAB (www.kgab.com). Kouri also serves as political advisor for Emmy and Golden Globe winning actor Michael Moriarty.

To subscribe to Kouri’s newsletter write to COPmagazine@aol.com and write “Subscription” on the subject line.

For 2012, much has changed for Oprah.  She now has her own cable channel that has been struggling to find an audience…. She isn’t going to do anything to alienate them.  She is fighting everyday to get people to tune in.

Interesting.  I posted this on Facebook and received a comment which perhaps explains her fears.  Paraphrasing Carole Logan:

Honestly, she is the biggest sanctimonious, guilt-ridden, elitist snob ever to epitomize liberalism.  She has enormous success due to her vapid existence on daytime television stroking the emotions of scores of pathetic women who would do better reading than watching chit-chat about the most inane tripe culture can produce.  Oprah—just be thankful you pull down more than the GNP of small nations, and go away!  Every time I see her doe-eyed, rapt, child-like attention on the latest trend of spiritual nonsense which she pedantically dissects as some form of  “enlightenment,” I desperately want to skewer my eyes like olives and guzzle them down with gin.

Carole informs me that she does not need anger management.  For her and many others, however, Oprah’s sanction of The One We’ve Been Waiting For was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back.

Greg Halvorson is the founder of Soldiers Without Boots, and hosts Freedom Warrior Radio on Blog Talk Radio.

gchalv@gmail.com

An update on Dick Blumenthal (D-CN) provides proof. This moron, running for Senate – as a Dem, go figure – was the “man,” you’ll recall, who addressed veterans groups by declaring himself a Marine, implying combat experience, and pretending, humbly, to have endured Vietnam.

It turns out, though, that the closest he got to Southeast Asia was a take-out order of rice in D.C. Blumenthal lied, time and again (excuse me, “wasn’t clear”), while generating the impression among media (no less than eight articles attested to him being a veteran of the war) and the public that, as a man of honor, he served his nation.

“We have learned something important since the days I served in Vietnam,” he told a ceremony honoring veterans and senior citizens. “And you exemplify it. Whatever we think about the war, whatever we call it – Afghanistan or Iraq – we owe our military unconditional support.”

“When we returned,” he told a group of families honoring veterans, “we saw nothing like this. Let us do better by this generation of men and women. I served during the Vietnam era, and I remember the taunts, the insults, sometimes even the physical abuse.”

What honor. Coming from a broom-pusher who pulled strings to serve stateside, what a disqualifier, too. Anyone with a soul would run and hide, for nothing – and I mean nothing – is less forgivable in the public sphere than receiving credit for false service and using it for political gain. According to the (hold your nose) New York Times, Blumenthal, from 1965 to ‘70, received FIVE military deferments before landing a spot as a reserve Marine. There, he bravely conducted drills (in New Haven), focused on “projects,” and organized toy drives—though it must be said that some of the toys may have been weapons!

The question, of course, is why, having been outed, is this putz still around? How does it end, does it, and to what corner of purgatory does he slither and cry?

Well, if the latest Quinnipiac poll is any indication, the answer is, it ends well, and he doesn’t cry but celebrates coming victory. Character, it appears, is of less import to Connecticuns than the willingness to pander, because Dick leads Linda McMahon, a GOP punch-line, by SEVENTEEN POINTS.

As disgraces rate, I can think of few larger (the Ground Zero mosque?), but the underlying issue precedes the candidate. The real insult lies with the People, the “useful idiots,” willing to blindly vote, regardless of character, for the prize Party Stooge. This isn’t about party, it’s about principle.

And America has lost that. Between government schools, a leftist media, and the attack on morality, America has not only “gone off the rails,” it has swapped virtue for vice. A moral people does not embrace scoundrels. Blumenthal personifies “scoundrel,” a soulless cretin willing to lie for votes, who when caught in a lie, breezily sidesteps.

One would hope this wouldn’t stand, not in a Republic, but we’re really no longer a nation of laws. In the public sphere, vice is rewarded, welcome, and it’s nothing to lie about serving your country. Country is subject, foremost, to rule. And what really matters is serving yourself.

Greg Halvorson is the founder of Soldiers Without Boots, and hosts Freedom Warrior Radio on Blog Talk Radio.

Greg Halvorson
gchalv@gmail.com

Of course, broad statements alone aren’t enough to suspect that attack plans are in the works. There are, however, other reasons to believe that the day of reckoning for Tehran’s nuclear program is drawing near. Iran continues to add centrifuges for producing highly enriched uranium, with thousands now in operation. At the same time, Tehran is working to perfect a long-range missile capability that could accurately deliver a nuclear warhead to a target. Some analysts believe Iran could be a nuclear-armed regional power as soon as 2011. Such a development would be a game changer in the Middle East, neutralizing the deterrent effect of Israel’s own nuclear arsenal and potentially sparking an arms race in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other states pursue their own nuclear weapons capability to counter growing Iranian power.

How would an Israeli attack unfold? Given that the United States would be unlikely to agree to over flight of Iraq for a military strike on Iran, Israel could transit Saudi Arabian airspace enroute to targets in Natanz, Esfahan, and Arak. Mossad chief Meir Dagan alluded to as much when he reportedly told Netanyahu recently that Riyadh would look the other way if Israeli aircraft flew over the Kingdom in the process of attacking Iranian nuclear facilities. Such a move would also not require U.S. consent. Israeli pilots have been training for quite some time for an attack on Iran, and air strikes would probably be accompanied by long-range missile attacks. A strong and sustained attack could be expected to inflict significant damage on Iranian nuclear facilities, but the blow would not be a lethal one. Iran has gone to great lengths to disperse, bury and protect its nuclear infrastructure, and while Tehran’s nuclear program would most certainly be set back, it would not be eliminated.

Israel is capable of conducting an effective attack, and neither the United States nor anyone else could do anything to stop it. The real concern is the potential aftermath. If history is any guide, the international community, under the auspices of the United Nations, would probably not do much. Arab states, and most likely some of America’s allies, would demand punitive sanctions, although the final product would undoubtedly be another meaningless Security Council resolution that is not enforced by anyone of any significance. Such was the case when Israel attacked Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981, and in 2007 when Israel destroyed what is widely believed to have been a Syrian nuclear facility in the making. There would, of course, be official condemnations from nations within and outside the Middle East. But deep down there would be a strong sense of relief, for Arab countries worried about rising Persian power, and for Western nations who have failed on their own to deal with a defiant and belligerent Iran.

The big unknown is Tehran’s reaction. Iran could step up attacks against U.S. military personnel in Iraq, or stoke sectarian strife between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shiites. Hezbollah could also be prodded, with its tens of thousands of rockets, to attack Israeli cities from southern Lebanon, or Iran could funnel arms and money to insurgent forces in Afghanistan. Iran might launch its own long-range missiles at Israel, or it might have its operatives conduct worldwide terrorist attacks against Israeli and Western soft targets like embassies and private businesses. All of these are possibilities, and all must be taken into account before Israel decides to strike. The determining factor will be whether or not Israel believes the benefits of an attack outweigh the potential risks of an Iranian response. I suspect we’ll find out the answer soon enough.

Speaking to the cable news network CNBC shortly after the Iranian election, President Barack Obama said, “Either way, we are going to be dealing with an Iranian regime that has historically been hostile to the United States, that has caused some problems in the neighborhood and is pursuing nuclear weapons. And so we’ve got long term interests in having them not weaponize nuclear power and stop funding organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas. And that would be true whoever came out on top in this election.”
The President, who has been severely criticized for taking this position, is basically correct. The Iranian President is irrelevant as far as U.S. foreign policy is concerned. Ahmadinejad may have, with the help of the clerical regime that runs Iran, stolen the election. Then again he may not have. Ahmadinejad is very popular with large segments of Iran’s population. The nearly two-thirds of the vote he received in the election mirrors the limited, although suspect, polling numbers available prior to votes being cast, and is very close to the 62 percent he received when first elected in 2005. There are, of course, legitimate reasons for concern about the integrity of the electoral process, but outright fraud on a scale large enough to steal the election by such a significant margin is tough to prove.

Either way it doesn’t matter. Each of the four candidates running for president was hand-picked from a pool of nearly 500 applicants by the Guardian Council, an unelected body of clerics that, along with the Supreme Leader, wields the real power in Iran. Each of the candidates, including Mousavi, supported Iran’s quest for nuclear technology. Mousavi may have proved to be less confrontational and less problematic than Ahmadinejad, but that, in the grand scheme of things, is unimportant. The president in Iran is subordinate to the Supreme Leader. It is Khamenei who is calling the shots and who has the final word on foreign policy, state support for terrorism, national security, and the nuclear program. The important thing to take away from Iran’s presidential election is that the contest between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi, or more precisely the response to Iranian citizens demonstrating against the regime, exposed Iran for what it is: a brutal, theocratic dictatorship that is more interested in maintaining an exclusive hold on power than it is in moving Iran forward.

In the months and years to come, the United States will have to figure out what to do about Iran’s activities in the Middle East. The oppression of the Iranian people is important, in the long-term. But in the short-term, the United States must be more focused on Iran’s continued support of terrorism through its proxies Hezbollah and Hamas, the continued funding, arming, and training by Tehran of militia forces in Iraq and insurgent forces in Afghanistan, and Iran’s ongoing defiance of the international community over its suspected nuclear weapons acquisition efforts. Demonstrations of support for opponents of Iran’s clerical regime are justified and proper, and in keeping with traditional American values. But right now it is more critical for the United States to keep its eye on the ball and to focus its efforts on those issues that currently affect, or could potentially affect in the future, American national security.

Just as Supreme Leader Khamenei offered no concessions to the hundreds of thousands of protestors on the streets in cities throughout Iran, he will offer no concessions to us. That has been made abundantly clear, despite President Obama’s repeated overtures for dialogue and compromise. Keeping diplomatic channels open is appropriate, but no option should be taken off the table. It’s time to stop dilly dallying around with Tehran and get serious. There is no greater destabilizing force in the region, and the international community has got to take tougher action. Only strong, truly international measures that inflict serious pain on Iran are likely to have an effect. Tough sanctions enforced by the United States and some European allies are not all that tough when countries like Russia and China ignore them. Military force may be necessary at some point, and the world should prepare for that possibility. The aftermath of the presidential election in Iran put on display for all the word to see the brutal nature of the Iranian regime. It remains to be seen, though, if world is up to the task of dealing with the Iranian problem once and for all.

The problems in Afghanistan are numerous, and they are complex. The central government is corrupt and incapable of extending its authority outside of the capital, Kabul. The country’s infrastructure has essentially been destroyed by decades of war. The Afghan security forces are ill-equipped, ill-trained, and insufficient in number to have an appreciable impact for several more years. The NATO alliance is divided, short of manpower, and restricted by national caveats that prevent the military forces of many European nations from conducting combat operations. A porous border region allows insurgents, terrorists and criminal elements to conduct attacks within Afghanistan and then retreat to Pakistan with near impunity. Finally, the Taliban, easily removed from power by the United States in October 2001, has regained the momentum and is taking control of increasing swathes of territory while slowly building support among some segments of the Afghan population. No matter how you look at it, the United States and its NATO allies, while not necessarily losing the war, are clearly not winning it.

It is into this environment that the United States is surging troops, much like President Bush’s effort in Iraq in 2007 and 2008. But Afghanistan is not Iraq, and those looking for an Iraqi-style change in the Afghan security environment are likely to be disappointed. Afghanistan has no civil society or sense of nationalism comparable to that which existed in Iraq. The primary enemy force, the Taliban, is religiously motivated and not interested in the mere acquisition of power. They will not be driven to the bargaining table through the use of force. Protection of the population is problematic, with the ratio of military forces in Afghanistan worse than in Iraq. Counterinsurgency 101 dictates that the security of the people is the number one priority, but the United States and its allies do not have the manpower to effectively safeguard Afghan civilians.

So what’s likely to happen over the next 18 to 24 months? U.S. forces will valiantly take the fight to the enemy, attempting to clear, hold and build in areas currently dominated by Taliban militants. American and NATO casualties will inevitably increase, perhaps sharply, as is generally the case when a military force goes on the offensive. As casualty rates go up, public support in the United States, Europe and Canada, already shaky, will drop, perhaps drastically. The surge, temporary because ongoing commitments dictate that it must be, will not change the basic metrics of the war. Public support will be at an all-time low and America’s allies will be looking for a way out, if they haven’t left already. The United States, faced with a tough choice on the best way ahead, will be able to say that it has done everything that could be done. A decade of war with no tangible results makes for a compelling case for withdrawal.

When the decision to leave Afghanistan is made, and it will be made soon, the United States will be able to redeploy its forces knowing that it has achieved its original objectives. When the U.S. entered Afghanistan nearly 8 years ago, it did so with two primary goals: defeating al Qaeda and denying the use of Afghanistan as a base of operations for Islamic terrorists with global reach. Both of these goals have already been reached. Al Qaeda as it existed on September 11, 2001 is defunct. While some command capability has been regained by a few top al Qaeda leaders hiding in the Afghanistan – Pakistan border area, bin Laden and Zawahiri are in command of nothing, forced by relentless U.S. pressure to worry more about personal survival than global jihad. The real danger posed by al Qaeda today is manifested in the multitude of regional and local affiliates that have evolved since the start of the U.S. – Afghan war. There is, of course, still a danger that Afghanistan could once again become a terrorist safe haven, but that danger exists with the same degree of likelihood in multiple places around the world. A strong focus on Pakistan, the real central front in the fight against radical Islam, would allow the United States to respond to terrorist developments in Afghanistan if there was a need to do so.

Just as in Iraq, the surge in Afghanistan will be followed by a general withdrawal of U.S. military forces. It is hard to envision a scenario though, where a residual element like the one planned for Iraq is left behind to support the central government. Afghanistan has no real strategic value for the United States, and it would be a hard sell to continue a decade-long war in which Americans were dying while bin Laden remained at-large, the Taliban refused to concede defeat, and the Afghan government continued to flounder. None of the current realities are likely to change as a result of the surge. The United States has exacted its revenge for the 9/11 attacks, and the departure from Afghanistan is likely just around the corner. The question is how many Americans will die between now the time Washington decides the war is over?

For too long the United States has viewed Pakistan as a secondary effort in the fight for Afghanistan. The primary focus has always been on rooting out the Afghan Taliban, defeating al Qaeda, and supporting the Karzai government in Kabul. Efforts directed at Pakistan were singularly focused on getting the Pakistani government to police its side of the Afghan-Pakistan border. The United States was slow to recognize that the true center of gravity was not in Afghanistan, but in neighboring Pakistan.

Pakistan has, over the past several years, become the global center of Islamic radicalism. The Pakistani armed forces are either unwilling or unable to stop the Taliban and other groups of militants, and the ISI still provides support to terrorist elements within Pakistan’s borders. The Pakistani government lacks public support and the economy is suffering greatly from the global financial crisis. Political and economic instability and military intransigence provide numerous opportunities for Islamists that promise order, stability and desperately needed social services. The conditions in Pakistan today actually make the Taliban look more attractive to the average citizen than the Pakistani government.

It’s no surprise that Islamic militants have increasingly been on the march. They smell blood and are moving in for the kill. In mid-February, the Pakistani government signed a peace deal with the Taliban that was supposed to end military operations in the Swat Valley and establish Islamic law, Sharia, in several parts of Pakistan’s northwest. The Malakand Accord, as it was called, was interpreted by the Taliban as a sign of weakness on the part of the Pakistani government. Rather than settling for the gains achieved under the peace deal, the Taliban began moving, closing to within 60 miles of the capital, Islamabad, just last month. The lesson to be learned is a simple one. There is no dealing with Islamic radicals. They view negotiations as nothing more than a mechanism for gaining some sort of an advantage, and now they’re getting close to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.

The problem in Pakistan is only going to get worse in the foreseeable future, and the world will probably witness yet another military takeover in Islamabad. This is not necessarily a bad thing, at least until the threat from Islamic extremists is brought under control. It is also not uncommon in Pakistan’s history. Since the country was born shortly after World War II, it has been under military rule for slightly more than 30 years. Just over half of its life has been controlled by the Pakistani military and not by civilian governments. The most recent military government was the regime of General Pervez Musharraf, which came to power in a coup in 1999. This time around the country could be led by General Ashfaq Kayani, the current chief of staff of the Pakistani Army. One thing is certain: the current path that Pakistan is on cannot continue. If it does, the Pakistani government will fail. A failed Pakistani state would be the ultimate nightmare scenario, with horrific consequences not just for Pakistan, but for the entire international community.

The United States has finally recognized that it is Pakistan that is the central front in the global fight against Islamic extremism. It does not appear, however, that the Pakistani government has reached the same conclusion. There have been a few Pakistani military offensives, but the effort has been half-hearted at best. Even the current operation in Buner has a time limit on it, making it clear that the Pakistani government does not intend to stay and hold the territory it is currently fighting to take back from the Taliban.

Pakistan is losing its fight against the extremists, and the world is losing Pakistan. The alarms have been sounded, but not much else is likely to happen. The simple reality is that once you get past the rhetoric, the calls for increased Pakistani action, and the pleas for international assistance, it’s not hard to see that the United States is watching from the sidelines and is essentially powerless to do anything more.

Taking the fight to the pirates first requires identifying who they are and why they do what they do. The pirates attacking cargo and fishing vessels off the coast of Somalia are not maritime terrorists, as some have suggested. They have no political purpose and no specific, predetermined civilian targets. They are, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently said, common criminals who attack targets of opportunity with the goal of making a fast buck through ransom payments or the sale of captured cargo. They are the product of a failed Somali state, and until the conditions that prompt their actions are addressed, they will not go away. The problem for the United States, and the international community, is that no one seems to have the stomach for another intervention in Somalia.

If no country or group of countries is willing to undertake the massive nation-building effort that would be required to establish a functioning state in Somalia, one that would provide non-criminal opportunities for income and prosperity, then the only solution for the foreseeable future is strategic management of the piracy problem. Actions taken thus far have not worked. Patrolling the shipping lane off the Somali coast is an inefficient and ineffective use of critical naval resources. The area to be monitored is too vast for the number of ships available for patrols, and the tactics used by the pirates – moving in fast on small boats and quickly taking control of targeted ships – minimize the reaction time available to allied navies. Paying ransoms, which several shipping companies have done, has rewarded the pirates’ behavior and promoted additional attacks.

So what can be done? While there is no silver bullet or magic solution for bringing the piracy under control, there are several courses of action the United States can take, with or without assistance from other nations threatened by Somali pirates. To begin, the crews of vessels transiting the shipping lane off the coast of Somalia can be armed so that they can defend themselves against pirate attacks. Thus far shipping companies have balked at this idea because of the increased risk of harm to crew members and because of legitimate legal concerns. But relying on reactive naval support from the international community is not a practical solution, and the arming of crews with sonic cannons, water guns, and lethal small arms and crew-served weapons remains the best option for an immediate response to the piracy problem.

A second option is the use of contracted security personnel. This no doubt would be a controversial course of action, given the allegations made against private security contractors in Iraq, but shipping companies could bear the cost of protection for commercial cargo and receive assistance from the United States, or other participating nations, for humanitarian shipments sent to Africa by foreign governments. Another possibility is the use of a convoy system like that used to escort allied supply ships during World War II. At a minimum, the United States could maximize the use of its naval forces in the region by grouping multiple cargo ships together under the protection of the U.S. Navy. Ideally, other nations would participate in a convoy system, guaranteeing safe passage for ships involved in international trade. Those shipping companies declining to participate because of business worries concerning speed of transport and loss of control and flexibility would be responsible for their own safety and security. Finally, the United States and other willing nations could target the assets and safe havens used by the pirates in the planning and execution of their attacks. That means hitting the docks where they moor their boats, destroying their “mother ships” and attack craft, and taking out the facilities where they live, primarily in the Puntland region and especially in the “pirate city” of Eyl.

None of these measures, employed either individually or in concert with other measures, will completely eliminate the piracy problem. As long as Somalia remains an ungoverned space, and as long as the international community remains reluctant to bring that ungoverned space under control, the conditions that motivate the pirates will continue to produce armed thugs that seek out weak targets in the waters off the Somali coast. But the absence of a final resolution to the problem is not an excuse for continued inaction, especially when the lives of Americans are at stake. To protect U.S.-flagged ships and American crews, and to ensure the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid and international trade, the United States must take immediate action to reduce the problem of Somali piracy to a manageable level.

It was with these realities in mind that the United States unveiled last week its new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, a comprehensive approach with a mission clearly stated by President Obama: “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.” By putting the full weight of the U.S. government behind the new strategy, President Obama has decided to go “all in” in an effort to turn this war around. The real question, though, is whether the United States has the stomach to see this fight through beyond an immediate push and through to a successful conclusion.

The U.S. strategy has six main elements: an increase in aid to Pakistan, a surge of military forces to Afghanistan, an accelerated training program for Afghan security forces, a reconciliation plan for moderate insurgents, an increase in civilian support to Afghanistan, and a regional diplomatic push to get neighboring states to take more responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.

The United States has been providing aid to the Pakistani government since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and sadly has little to show for the billions of dollars spent thus far. Future allocations of American dollars will attempt to strengthen the Pakistani government and increase its ability to fight Islamic insurgents by targeting the aid more toward civilian institutions and less toward the Pakistani military. Whether this will work or not remains to be seen, but given the tremendous influence of the military in both government and societal affairs, the odds are not in our favor.

The next three elements of the strategy are all borrowed from the war in Iraq. Under President Bush a brigade combat team destined for Iraq was diverted to Afghanistan to help counter increased attacks by Taliban fighters. President Obama followed suit by ordering 21,000 more troops to Afghanistan (12,000 combat, 5,000 support, and 4,000 trainers) during 2009. The “surge” strategy, implemented so effectively in Iraq during 2007, is now being employed in Afghanistan. President Obama has also ordered an acceleration of the training of Afghan security forces in a manner similar to the effort undertaken in Iraq after years of neglecting the training of Iraqi army and police elements. Recognizing that some Taliban and al Qaeda fighters are motivated by reasons other than religious zeal, the new U.S. strategy calls for a reconciliation program that gives additional options to moderate, low-level insurgents motivated by money or other negotiable causes.

In sending more civilian experts from across the federal government to Afghanistan, the U.S. strategy is seeking to improve Afghan governance and support to the population. To be truly effective, though, these civilians will need to venture out from the capital, Kabul, and into the countryside. Counterinsurgency efforts are won or lost with the populace and it will be critical for governance and aid projects to be visible to the Afghan people. Finally, the new U.S. strategy calls for a strong diplomatic push throughout the region. Finding common ground among Afghanistan’s neighbors will be difficult, to be sure, given the different national interests involved. Still, the effort must be made in the hope that key regional players will recognize that stable and secure governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan are a benefit to all.

The road ahead promises to be difficult and some elements of the new U.S. strategy will be more successful than others. The key question on everyone’s mind is whether the United States has the staying power necessary to fully execute the strategy and ultimately, to secure victory in Afghanistan. Will our resolve wane when casualties inevitably rise as a result of taking the fight to the enemy with our beefed up military presence? Will we tire when progress is slow and difficult to come by? Will we rethink our strategy, and our effort, when this fight drags on year after year after year?

The answer to the question about our stomach for a prolonged and costly Afghan fight is critical, but it is not yet clear. The message we send to our allies, to the governments in Kabul and Islamabad, to Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, and to the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan is one that we had better get right. Any sign of weakness or wavering resolve will be seized upon by friend and foe alike, emboldening our enemies to wait out our departure, undermining support for government leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and providing an opportunity for already skittish NATO member states to abandon what many consider to be a sinking ship. The United States has gone “all in,” and it is critical, now more than ever, that we follow up our new strategy with a sustained and public demonstration of our commitment to winning this war.

Since the summer of 2007, there has been a substantial decline in violence in Iraq. Virtually every metric tracked by the United States military has shown marked improvement. Attacks of all types have dropped significantly, and casualty rates for U.S. troops and Iraqis are the lowest they’ve been in years. Iraqi security forces continue to grow in size and capability, al Qaeda in Iraq has been virtually destroyed, political accommodation is progressing, and the central government in Baghdad is increasingly taking control of security operations throughout the country. Former President Bush’s “surge” of American troops, a change in strategy and tactics by the U.S. military command in Baghdad, the Anbar Awakening by Sunnis fed up with al Qaeda, and the retreat of Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army combined to effect change in Iraq that has been not only positive, but sustained.

Even though significant progress has been made, there remain several reasons for Mr. Obama and his Defense Department to be cautious about withdrawing from Iraq too quickly. Ethnic and sectarian differences have not disappeared, and some Iraqi politicians are more interested in personal power than in making Iraq a stable and prosperous nation. The Kurds are increasingly nervous about the intentions of the central government in Baghdad, and many important political issues, especially those concerning Iraq’s oil resources, remain unresolved. The overall level of violence is still about as high as it was in early 2004, and Iraqi security forces, while significantly better than they were just two years ago, will be dependent upon American military support for several years to come. While it is true that the United States cannot solve all of Iraq’s problems, the need for continued American guidance and military support cannot be overstated. Withdrawal rhetoric aside, Mr. Obama appears to understand the risks associated with a precipitous American pullout from Iraq.

Details of the plan made available thus far reveal that only 2 of the 14 combat brigades currently deployed in Iraq will be removed before the next round of elections in December. That means at the end of 2009 there will still be more than 130,000 American military personnel on the ground. At that point, the United States would have to remove 12 combat brigades from Iraq in only 8 months, a task that would pose tremendous logistical challenges under the best of circumstances, much less under fire from terrorists and insurgent forces.

Even if the U.S. were to execute such an ambitious course of action, Mr. Obama would leave in place a residual force of up to 50,000 personnel to train Iraqi security forces, target foreign terrorists, and guard American assets like the U.S. Embassy. A force of 50,000, working closely with Iraqi security forces, means that some American troops would undoubtedly remain in harm’s way. In fact, some would probably continue to execute combat missions, despite the claim that no combat forces would stay in Iraq beyond August 2010. The New York Times reported as much February 25 when it cited defense officials who “…did not know how many combat troops would stay behind in new missions as trainers, advisers or counterterrorism forces, at least some of whom would still be effectively in combat roles.” The Times added, “Military planners have said that in order to meet withdrawal deadlines, they would reassign some combat troops to training and support of the Iraqis, even though the troops would still be armed and go on combat patrols with their Iraqi counterparts.” By delaying the departure of all but two combat brigades until next year, and by leaving critical combat power in place as part of a residual force, Mr. Obama is giving himself the flexibility he may need to slow or stop the withdrawal of American forces if Iraq begins to fall apart. Logistics limitations effectively eliminate the possibility of accelerating the departure of American combat forces, even if conditions on the ground continue to improve.

These emerging details could be why many Republicans have expressed support for the President’s plan, while key Democrats, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi included, have made clear that they are not satisfied with Mr. Obama’s Iraq strategy. In the end it doesn’t matter if President Obama is playing word games with the definitions of “combat,” “trainer,” and “adviser,” or if he has learned the most valuable lesson of President Bush’s surge—that you can’t fight this war on the cheap; you have to commit the resources required to win. What matters in the end, for the United States, for Iraq, for the Middle East, and for the world, is that President Obama gets Iraq right.